

Witness Generation for Data-flow Analysis

Master's Thesis

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- 2 Abstract reachability graphs
- 3 Interprocedural data-flow analysis
- 4 Refinement loop
- 5 Conclusion

Static program analyzer:

Input program

Input specification — e.g., does not reach error

Output satisfies/violates specification

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Problems with boolean output

Unhelpful does not say where and why violates

Untrustworthy analyzer itself may contain bugs

- Proof objects — key information for proof:
 - Violation witness error path
 - Correctness witness invariants
- Formalized as automata

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 - **Violation witness** error path
 - **Correctness witness** invariants
- Formalized as automata

Benefits of witnesses

Helpful understandable by programmers

Trustworthy automatically checkable by independent tools

Comparable Competition on Software Verification (SV-COMP)

Data-flow analysis

- Static analysis technique
 - Solve constraint system over complete lattice
- Overapproximation of all program paths
 - Efficient
 - Well-suited for certain problems
- Used by Goblint
 - Multi-threaded C programs
 - University of Tartu, Technical University of Munich

Data-flow analysis

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Problem with data-flow analysis

- Computation does not correspond to required witness

Goal and contribution

- Design methods for generating witnesses with data-flow analysis
- Implement and evaluate them in Goblint

Abstract reachability graphs (ARGs)

- Directed graph (automaton) of reachable abstract program states
- Internal representation of many analyzers
- Easily convertible to witnesses

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Problems with ARGs


- Not used in data-flow analysis
- Function calls must be inlined

Interprocedural ARGs

Basic inlining

```
void foo(int x, int y)
{
    assert(x < y);
}

int main()
{
    foo(1, 2);
    return 0;
}
```




Interprocedural ARGs

Context-sensitive inlining

```
void foo(int x, int y)
{
    assert(x < y);
}

int main()
{
    foo(1, 2);
    foo(2, 4); // added
    return 0;
}
```




Interprocedural ARGs

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1 Context-sensitively inlined ARG

- Sound extension of constraint system
- Record context-sensitive predecessor relationship
- Gives reachability information

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2 Call-site-sensitively inlined ARG

- Postprocess previous ARG
- Ensures unique entering and returning transitions

Witness analysis

Original constraint system:

$$[\text{entry}_{\text{main}}, c_{\text{main}}] \sqsupseteq d_{\text{main}}$$

$$[v, c] \sqsupseteq \llbracket s \rrbracket^\# (\text{get } [u, c])$$

$$\forall u \xrightarrow{s} v$$

$$[v, c] \sqsupseteq \mathbf{let} (c', d') = \text{enter}^\# (\text{get } [u, c])$$

$$\forall u \xrightarrow{f()} v$$

$$() = \text{set } [\text{entry}_f, c'] \quad d'$$

$$\mathbf{in} \text{ combine}^\# (\text{get } [u, c]) (\text{get } [\text{return}_f, c'])$$

Witness analysis

Extended constraint system:

$$[\text{entry}_{\text{main}}, c_{\text{main}}] \sqsupseteq (d_{\text{main}}, \emptyset)$$

$$[v, c] \sqsupseteq (\llbracket s \rrbracket^\# \langle \text{get } [u, c] \rangle_1, \{([u, c], s)\}) \quad \forall u \xrightarrow{s} v$$

$$[v, c] \sqsupseteq \mathbf{let} (c', d') = \text{enter}^\# \langle \text{get } [u, c] \rangle_1 \quad \forall u \xrightarrow{f()} v$$

$$() = \text{set } [\text{entry}_f, c'] (d', \{([u, c], \text{enterFunction}_f)\})$$

$$\mathbf{in} (\text{combine}^\# \langle \text{get } [u, c] \rangle_1 \langle \text{get } [\text{return}_f, c'] \rangle_1, \\ \{([\text{return}_f, c'], \text{returnFromFunction}_f)\})$$

In every reached context c :

- Every reached $u \xrightarrow{s} v$ gives $[u, c] \xrightarrow{s} [v, c]$
- Every reached $u \xrightarrow{f()} v$ gives

$$[u, c] \xrightarrow{\text{enterFunction}_f} [\text{entry}_f, c'] \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [\text{return}_f, c'] \xrightarrow{\text{returnFromFunction}_f} [v, c]$$

On Goblint implementation:

- Manual testing
 - Small crafted programs
 - Manual witness inspection
 - Confirms correct context- and call-site-sensitive inlining

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- SV-COMP testing
 - “SoftwareSystems-DeviceDriversLinux64-ReachSafety” category
 - Confirms acceptance by independent validators


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Problems revealed by SV-COMP testing


- Many false positive violations
- Imprecise (violation) witnesses

Refinement loop algorithm




Refinement example

```
int main()
{
  int r, x, y;
  if (r)
  {
    x = 0;
    y = 1;
  }
  else
  {
    x = 1;
    y = 0;
  }
  if (x + y != 1)
    error();
  return 0;
}
```



Refinement example

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


Refinement example — observer


Infeasible program subpath:

$$2 \xrightarrow{x = 0} 3 \xrightarrow{y = 1} 6 \xrightarrow{[x + y \neq 1]} 7$$


Observer automaton:



Refinement example — refined



Refinement example — refined



Contribution:

- Designed methods for generating interprocedural witnesses with data-flow analysis
- Adapted a model-checking method to improve precision
- Implemented both in Goblint
- Evaluated both experimentally

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Conclusion

Witnesses can be generated from existing data-flow analysis


Thank you!

Interprocedural ARGs

Call-site-sensitive inlining

```
void foo(int x, int y)
{
    assert(x < y);
}

int main()
{
    foo(1, 2);
    foo(1, 2); // changed
    return 0;
}
```




Interprocedural ARGs

Call-site-sensitive inlining

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void foo(int x, int y)
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    return 0;
}
```



Call-string lifting

Given ARG $A_{\text{context}} = (V, S', \delta, [\text{entry}_{\text{main}}, c_{\text{main}}])$

Define ARG $A_{\text{callsite}} = (V^*, S', \delta', [[\text{entry}_{\text{main}}, c_{\text{main}}]])$

- V^* is the set of lists with elements from V
- δ' is defined for all $[u_1, \dots, u_n] \in V^*$ by:

$$[u_1, \dots, u_n, u] \xrightarrow[\delta']{s} [u_1, \dots, u_n, v] \iff u \xrightarrow{\delta} v$$


$$[u_1, \dots, u_n, u] \xrightarrow[\delta']{\text{enterFunction}_f} [u_1, \dots, u_n, u, v] \iff u \xrightarrow{\delta} v$$

$$[u_1, \dots, u_n, u] \xrightarrow[\delta']{\text{returnFromFunction}_f} [u_1, \dots, u_{n-1}, v] \iff$$

$$\iff u \xrightarrow{\delta} v \wedge \langle u_n \rangle_1 \xrightarrow[E]{f()} \langle v \rangle_1 \wedge \langle u_n \rangle_2 = \langle v \rangle_2$$

Violation example

```
int main()
{
    int r, x, y;
    if (r)
    {
        x = 0;
        // removed
    }
    else
    {
        x = 1;
        y = 0;
    }
    if (x + y != 1)
        error();
    return 0;
}
```




Violation example — error path

Feasible program path:

$$1 \xrightarrow{[r]} 2 \xrightarrow{x = 0} 6 \xrightarrow{[x + y \neq 1]} 7$$

Feasible model: $r = 1$ and $y = 0$.

Violation witness with edge assumptions ψ :



Feasibility analysis


Feasible path

Feasible program subpath:

$$1 \xrightarrow{d = s - t} 2 \xrightarrow{[d \geq 2 \ \&\& \ d \leq 8]} 4 \xrightarrow{a = x ? 512 : 64} 5 \xrightarrow{b = a * d} 6 \xrightarrow{[b \geq 2048]} 7.$$

Feasible model: $s == 0$, $t == -4$ and $x == 2$.

Violation witness with edge assumptions ψ :




Feasibility analysis

Infeasible path

Infeasible program subpath:

$$1 \xrightarrow{p = 1} 2 \xrightarrow{x = 10} 3 \xrightarrow{[x > 0]} 4 \xrightarrow{[p \neq 1]} 5.$$

Non-deterministic observer automaton:



Observer analysis

Original constraint system:

$$[\text{entry}_{\text{main}}, c_{\text{main}}] \sqsupseteq d_{\text{main}}$$

$$\forall u \xrightarrow[E]{s} v$$

$$[v, c] \sqsupseteq \llbracket s \rrbracket^\# (\text{get } [u, c] \quad)$$

$$\forall u \xrightarrow[E]{f()} v$$

$$[v, c] \sqsupseteq \mathbf{let} (c', d') = \text{enter}^\# (\text{get } [u, c] \quad) \\ \quad \quad \quad () = \text{set } [\text{entry}_f, c'] \quad d' \\ \quad \quad \quad \mathbf{in} \perp$$

$$\forall u \xrightarrow[E]{f()} v$$

$$[v, c] \sqsupseteq \mathbf{let} (c', d') = \text{enter}^\# (\text{get } [u, c] \quad) \\ \quad \quad \quad \mathbf{in} \text{combine}^\# (\text{get } [u, c] \quad) (\text{get } [\text{return}_f, c'] \quad)$$

Observer analysis

Extended constraint system with observer automaton (Q, ω, q_0, F) :

If $q_0 \notin F$

$$([\text{entry}_{\text{main}}, c_{\text{main}}], q_0) \sqsupseteq d_{\text{main}}$$

$$\forall u \xrightarrow[E]{s} v \quad \forall q \xrightarrow[\omega_F]{(u,s,v)} q'$$

$$([v, c], q') \sqsupseteq \llbracket s \rrbracket^\# (\text{get}([u, c], q))$$

$$\forall u \xrightarrow[E]{f()} v \quad \forall q \xrightarrow[\omega_F]{(u, \text{enterFunction}_f, \text{entry}_f)} q' \quad \forall q''' \in Q$$

$$([v, c], q''') \sqsupseteq \mathbf{let} (c', d') = \text{enter}^\# (\text{get}([u, c], q)) \\ () = \text{set}([\text{entry}_f, c'], q') d'$$

in \perp

$$\forall u \xrightarrow[E]{f()} v \quad \forall q \xrightarrow[\omega_F]{(u, \text{enterFunction}_f, \text{entry}_f)} q' \quad \forall q'' \xrightarrow[\omega_F]{(\text{return}_f, \text{returnFromFunction}_f, v)} q''$$

$$([v, c], q''') \sqsupseteq \mathbf{let} (c', d') = \text{enter}^\# (\text{get}([u, c], q)) \\ \mathbf{in} \text{combine}^\# (\text{get}([u, c], q)) (\text{get}([\text{return}_f, c'], q''))$$